This chapter also contributes to debate in human rights scholarship. Progress has been made in specifying the linkages between international and domestic jurisdictions in human rights mobilisation (Risse 2013) . However, the impact of human rights instruments has often been assumed to be the outcome of transgovernmental processes contained principally to engagement among political elites (Finnemore 1996) . Less attention has been given to 'bottom-up' accounts of the effects of international human rights instruments (Simmons 2009: 138) . This is an important analytical move given that implementation is contingent on the mobilisation efforts of diverse actors. This is especially true of contexts displaying unstable rule of law frameworks where the limits of formal pathways to compliance are likely to be particularly profound (Levitsky and Murillo 2009 ). In such settings, the impact of IAHRS entities may be most evident in the intermediate actions that they take to facilitate mobilisation by pro-compliance actors on the ground. Such inquiry raises important questions regarding when and why the IAHRS will seek to coordinate with NHRIs and vice versa. This chapter pursues this line of inquiry.
Complementing a substantial scholarship on the role of human rights NGOs and the IAHRS (Cavallaro and Brewer 2008) , this chapter also highlights the role of a distinctive class of sub-state human rights actor located within state structures, but independent of government.
Their position within state structures and the status often attached to the office makes them potentially attractive agents for transnational mobilisation by the IAHRS, in terms of tapping into domestic sites of both political influence and resources. Importantly, NHRIs can also serve as venues for facilitating domestic mobilisation efforts by third party actors within civil society. NHRIs have at different moments made important contributions to advancing human rights protection in Latin America (Pegram 2012) . However, as this study highlights, it is important to also acknowledge the limitation of NHRIs. Even where robust official implementation mechanisms such as NHRIs exist, careful attention must be paid to their actual performance in order to avoid the risk of creating 'illusions of compliance' whereby formal rule-compliance substitutes for more meaningful indicators of positive change (Open Justice 2013: 16) .
To document our claims, the chapter draws on an extensive body of comparative information and interview data to substantiate the relationship between NHRIs and IAHRS. The analysis surveys the experience of these institutions across Latin America, with comparative analysis supplemented by an in-depth case study of the pioneering work of the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsmen in this field. The chapter begins with a discussion of NHRIs as IAHRS compliance intermediaries, with particular attention paid to their formal aptitude to assume such a function. We then highlight the formal relationship between NHRIs and the IAHRS before specifying modalities of engagement in greater detail, drawing on the experience of NHRIs throughout the region. The chapter closes with an in depth case study of the Peruvian office and an examination of what the analysis means for the future of NHRI-IAHRS relations and research on the system more generally.
National human rights institutions in Latin America
NHRIs are well-placed to serve as compliance intermediaries within the IAHRS, serving to link international human rights standards with domestic legal and political processes, institutions and actors (Carver 2000) . 2 NHRIs can be found in every country in Latin America, with the exception of Brazil. They are emblematic of the growing penetration of human rights structures within domestic jurisdictions throughout the Americas. 3 Locating
NHRIs within a transgovernmental framework highlights the importance of disaggregating the state, as well as mapping out the multiple linkages and relative power of sections of the state bureaucracy dealing with human rights (Slaughter 2004) . They are widely held to constitute an essential element of a strong national human rights system, acting as a bridge between governments and civil society, linking the rights of citizens with the responsibilities of the state, and creating connections between national laws and regional and international human rights mechanisms (Smith 2006) .
NHRIs can be located in theory as sitting at the intersection between vertical (direct electoral channels) and horizontal (state checks and balances) accountability domains within the state (O'Donnell 1998) . In Latin America, all of these offices conform to the international standards on NHRI design, the Paris Principles, which stipulate minimum design safeguards 2 The NHRI has been (loosely) defined as 'a body which is established by a Government under the constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically designed in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights' (UN 1995: 4) . 3 Outside of Europe, the Americas display the highest regional concentration of NHRIs, with twenty-six of thirty-five OAS members, or seventy-five percent, having established such an institution.
of independence and powers. 4 They are generally mandated to proactively advise the executive and public bureaucracy on public policy, as well as make recommendations on legislative projects and promote a broad rights mandate. The Colombian office, for example, has been praised for its coordination efforts across state bodies and for the information published in its reports. 5 Importantly, NHRIs receive complaints from the general public, at no cost to the complainant, and are mandated to pursue resolution of issues through engagement with the responsible public entity. This reactive power is complemented by the ability to initiate special investigations into any human rights issue at the institution's discretion. The public service orientation of the NHRI and its potential to serve as a national referent point for human rights discourse has been acknowledged by members of the IACHR.
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NHRIs generally exercise a 'fire alarm' form of oversight over the public bureaucracy (Przeworski et al. 1999) . Reflecting a core accountability role, safeguards of independence are generally robust, including no executive designation of personnel. However, it is also important to be attentive to less desirable outcomes, including competitive dynamics between these two sets of actors, and even conflict in situations where the independence of the NHRI or civil society organisations is in doubt.
National human rights institutions and the Inter-American Human Rights System
The rapid ascent of NHRIs as the normative 'vehicle of choice' is evident in the growth of dedicated infrastructure within the UN system (Pegram 2015) . In contrast to the UN, the IAHRS has not formalised arrangements with regional NHRIs. However, Latin American scholars have addressed the potential role that NHRIs can play in 'the creation of a culture of 10 Often, as in Colombia, national laws do not allow these institutions to take action against the state itself (of which they themselves are part) before an international court. However, it is important to note that while some NHRIs have actively worked to advance compliance with IAHRS rulings in domestic jurisdictions, this is not always straightforward.
Notably, the Colombian NHRI states that 'within the Colombian state, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for liaising with the IAHRS. In consequence, the Ombudsman plays a subsidiary role in the implementation of regional judicial norms and facilitating access to the system for victims'. 29 The Colombian office has emphasised resolution of human rights violations at the domestic level, for example, submitting legislative projects to strengthen extraordinary protection mechanisms (acción de tutela) for victims of human rights violations. 30 The case of Venezuela poses a particular challenge, with the Ombudsman conspicuously silent in pronouncing on the 2013 decision by the government to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Court. 31 The Ombudsman has since publicly questioned the independence of the IACHR. This section presents a mapping exercise of the interactive linkages between NHRIs, the Commission and the Court. We then turn to exploring in more depth this relationship in light of current developments and possibilities for further deepening interactive linkages.
A. The Commission and National Human Rights Institutions
The IACHR performs a quasi-judicial role as a first-stage complaint mechanism within the IAHRS. Conceptually, NHRI practitioners have described the IACHR as acting akin to 'a collegiate Ombudsman for human rights', noting the affinity in a modus operandi informed by a lack of legally binding authority and the potential for court referral (Santistevan 2004: 29 In 1996, the Argentinean NHRI lodged an appeal with the IACHR, alleging a violation of the rights of more than 65,000 pensioners. In parallel, the NHRI opened a domestic investigation highlighting the failure of the State and court system to rule on the matter. The IACHR opened a file on the NHRI's complaint in order to determine admissibility. However, before the Commission could formally rule on its admissibility the NHRI withdrew the petition following resolution by the Argentinean Supreme Court. As Mendez and Aguilar (1997: 273) note, this was a pioneering example of an NHRI successfully dovetailing a domestic and international compliance strategy. Confirmation of the NHRI's formal standing as a petitioner came in 2002 when the Peruvian NHRI submitted a petition in the Janet Espinoza case. The IACHR did not question the ability of the NHRI to lodge the petition.
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In reviewing the admissibility of petitions, the IACHR has engaged with NHRIs at each stage of the process. More broadly, as detailed below, a survey of NHRI activities reveals that they have submitted petitions, or been named as co-petitioners, have sought precautionary measures on behalf of claimants, and have participated in and requested public hearings. The Peruvian Ombudsman enjoys a range of powers which make it an attractive interlocutor for the IAHRS at the domestic level. Formally, the office has a broad and unrestrictive rights mandate and is instructed to 'promote the signature, ratification, implementation and effective diffusion of international human rights treaties'. 74 The office's standing as a constitutional body, with the Ombudsman enjoying status equivalent to that of a high court judge, combined with high public approval, combine to give the office an unusual degree of prestige. This has served to bolster the Ombudsman's role in the education and promotion of human rights at the domestic level. The office is tasked with a mandate to facilitate greater public awareness of human rights through information campaigns, education programmes, and training of public officials. Importantly, the institution can also intervene in the political policy process, with the ability to submit legislative projects as well as initiate constitutional review actions against legislation which falls foul of human rights guarantees.
The office may lack binding enforcement authority. However, its status as a 'magistrate of persuasion' is buttressed by a series of quasi-judicial functions, including the ability to bring legal actions before the Peruvian Constitutional Court (Santistevan 2000) . The office is empowered to investigate, either on receipt of an individual complaint or at its own initiative, any issue which it deems to fall within a broad and unrestrictive human rights mandate. The
Peruvian office has also pursued legal redress, including habeas corpus, habeas data, amparo and amicus curiae briefs action, 75 both on behalf of individuals and as a means to challenge systemic human rights violations. 76 It is the amicus curiae (friend of the court) role of the office which has perhaps gained the most widespread acceptance and recognition within the IAHRS. As noted above, it was the Peruvian office which secured official sanction from the IACHR to intervene as amicus at the international level, with a series of rulings drawing on information submitted by the NHRI, along with opinio juris derived from its experience. Eduardo Vega (2011-), emphasis has been placed on seeking redress at the domestic level with no litigation pursued at the IAHRS. The IAHRS has instead been employed indirectly, to buttress Ombudsman mobilisation efforts. The following discussion demarcates this strategic evolution broadly across these two time periods.
1996-2001: Exhausting Domestic Remedy and Exit
If its first five years was marked by the Ombudsman regularly accessing the IAHRS, the strategy has notably shifted since 2001. Beyond leadership, this move from exit (the ombudsman seeking remedy internationally) to internalisation (the ombudsman incorporating IAHRS standards in pursuit of domestic remedy) must also be placed in the context of newly democratic state structures and multiplying rights issues at the domestic level. Under Fujimori, the priority was massive violations of civil and political rights, which meant a focus on issues ranging from torture, to extra-judicial execution, the military judicial system and freedom of the press, among others (Pegram 2008) . These rights issues confronted an increasingly autocratic executive, willing and able to exercise de facto veto power over domestic remedy. The escalating assault by Fujimori on rule of law institutions in Peru is well-documented, with the effective dismantling of the Constitutional Tribunal, the use of "faceless judges" and impunity laws, among the most egregious examples (Youngers 2000) .
Given the limited potential for domestic remedy, Santistevan, supported by the legal expertise of both Alban (serving as Deputy Ombudsman) and Samuel Abad, proved ready to defy the regime by seeking remedy at the IAHRS, garnering support from domestic and international human rights observers in the process.
Outlined below are those emblematic legal cases in which the Ombudsman has been directly involved. Notably, Abad highlights that their strategy during this era was to limit litigation actions to those cases deemed emblematic so as to avoid becoming a de facto public defenders' office. onwards. 81 It also required that the state pass a law modifying rules on electoral quotas for women and declaring an affirmative action policy. The Ombudsman's Office, in turn, submitted a proposal to the IACHR which sought to bring the parties together to reach a friendly settlement. 82 The Ombudsman recommended that an official admission of liability be made in public in the presence of representatives from the National Jury of Elections (JNE) and that the apology be broadcast nationwide on the state television channel. The 84 See DP report 'Lineamientos para la reforma de la justicia militar en el Perú ', 1997. 85 See DP report '¿Quién juzga qué? Justicia Militar Vs. Justicia Ordinaria. 
2000-onwards: Pursuing Domestic Remedy and Internalisation
In a newly democratic era, the Ombudsman has encountered both more ambiguity regarding state commitment to rights protections and an expanded rights panorama, which has meant engaging issues that may be less amenable to judicial resolution. Much of the Ombudsman's current work is focused on three priority areas: (1) access to justice, especially violation of due process in the sentencing of delinquents, (2) Ombudsman "stood ready to take the case to the international system." 105 However, the government relented, reinstating the radio station's licence to broadcast. 106 As an
Ombudsman official remarks, "this would have been inconceivable under Fujimori". 107 Similarly, in a highly public confrontation between Defensor Eduardo Vega and the Humala government, the government was forced to suspend mandatory military service following a successful legal action by the Ombudsman before the Constitutional Tribunal which declared the practice discriminatory. Humala accused the Ombudsman of "endangering national security", but nevertheless complied with the ruling. 108 The office currently has another legal action pending before the Constitutional Tribunal regarding access to information. 109 If the case fails, "then we will evaluate the possibility of going to the international system". 
Means, Motive and Opportunity for Enhancing Interaction
Even in the contested arena of legacy violations, it is important to acknowledge that the relationship between the Peruvian government and the IAHRS is multi-faceted. There has been some progress, especially on reparations, if not prosecutions, for human rights crimes (Root 2013) . The state has also sought to pre-empt potential conflict with the IAHRS. For example, observers note that the retrial in 2001 of terrorism suspect, US citizen Lori
Berenson, was conducted with all due process guarantees carefully observed to avoid the sentence being subsequently struck down. 117 The case reached the IACtHR in 2004, with the Court upholding the conviction and sentence and Toledo welcoming the verdict. 118 However, the IACtHR's recent decision in Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez (Chavín de Huántar) vs.
Peru [2015] in favour of those convicted of terrorist offences have provoked powerful political opposition in Peru, as well as exposing collusion to undermine the IAHRS at the highest levels of government and the judiciary.
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The IAHRS could enhance its navigation of these complex dynamics. And the Peruvian
Ombudsman is well-placed to assist in that task. As a local interlocutor, the Peruvian office is credible with a broad range of civil society actors and other pro-reform constituencies. It is also well-placed to provide guidance to the IAHRS on the domestic political ecology which informs implementation actions at the local level. A senior Ombudsman official highlights three main ways in which the Ombudsman can assist the Court, Commission and other system agencies in their work: 120 1. System Diagnoses and Remedy: the Ombudsman can serve as a bridge between the IAHRS and the domestic jurisdiction. Enhancing knowledge of these two arenas in both directions is important. For the IAHRS, it is vital that system agents obtain an accurate picture of the internal political regime so that they can calibrate implementation efforts in light of domestic political conditions. The Ombudsman is well-placed to provide detailed insight into the specific context which gives rise to violations. Such information could enhance the precision of system resolutions and rulings.
2. Changing Public Opinion: At the domestic level, the Ombudsman can facilitate IAHRS efforts to enhance knowledge of its procedures so that diverse stakeholders, including judges, state bureaucrats, political elites and citizens, can familiarise themselves with the international machinery. The system is often criticised by vocal detractors internally for being elitist and handing down decisions which do not reflect the Peruvian reality. The Ombudsman could assist the IAHRS in improving its education and diffusion mechanisms in order to demonstrate that "the court is not for anything or anybody, rather that the court interprets the law and applies it as is appropriate". 121 Indeed, one concrete proposal would be for the court to hold its sessions in-country, facilitated by the Ombudsman and other actors.
3. Specialised Information: The Ombudsman is a valuable source of information for the IAHRS, including on specialised issues such as vulnerable groups, socioenvironmental conflict, structural violations regarding social security, access to information, and a range of other rights concerns. A vast repository of information can be found in its 160 published special reports. 122 This information "is impossible for the system to collect on its own and could help a lot in the elaboration of decisions". 
Conclusion
In light of this study, it is perhaps time for the IAHRS to more proactively engage a wider array of domestic intermediaries including NHRIs. The Peruvian Ombudsman has never received a request for assistance from the Court. This omission may be due to protocols established by the IAHRS which principally privilege the victim and the state in its procedures. With the state implicitly treated as monolithic, the Court and Commission have struggled to accommodate independent sub-state actors. Notwithstanding these constraints, this study has highlighted multiple ways in which credible NHRIs have engaged with the system and could yet further enhance its work.
The work of the IAHRS is by its nature difficult, intruding onto sovereign territory and calling powerful actors to account. The slow movement towards engaging with NHRIs in its work may well reflect reasonable fears on the part of IAHRS judges, commissioners, as well as bureaucrats, that such action will provoke backlash from their proximate political body and governmental delegations at the Organization of American States (OAS). However, given the resource constraints already imposed on the IAHRS, the benefits of more actively orchestrating activities with NHRIs may well outweigh the potential costs. It is also worth noting that the OAS has repeatedly endorsed the work of NHRIs in a series of resolutions stretching back to the mid-1990s. 124 The system could do more to engage credible NHRIs in its activities, both as a resource to buttress its own impact and to provide support for its embattled supporters at the domestic level.
If the IAHRS proves unwilling to further articulate its relationship with domestic rights constituencies, it risks deepening a sense of drift and distance from the realities of human rights politics on the ground. For NHRIs, such as the Peruvian Ombudsman, the day-to-day demands placed upon it will take priority over enhancing interaction with an international system which appears reluctant to reciprocate. The IAHRS needs the support of NHRIs and other domestic interlocutors if it is to sustain its relevance and secure implementation with its decisions. It is incumbent on all parties to respond positively to opportunities for deepening 
